Projecting lower competence to maintain moral warmth in the avoidance of prosocial requests by LIU, Peggy J. & LIN, Stephanie C.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
1-2018
Projecting lower competence to maintain moral
warmth in the avoidance of prosocial requests
Peggy J. LIU
University of Pittsburgh
Stephanie C. LIN
Singapore Management University, stephanielin@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/jcpy.1010
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons, and the Marketing
Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LIU, Peggy J. and LIN, Stephanie C.. Projecting lower competence to maintain moral warmth in the avoidance of prosocial requests.
(2018). Journal of Consumer Psychology. 28, (1), 23-39. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5403
Projecting Lower Competence to Maintain Moral Warmth in the Avoidance
of Prosocial Requests
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When faced with prosocial requests, consumers face a difﬁcult decision between taking on the request’s bur-
den or appearing unwarm (unkind, uncaring). We propose that the desire to refuse such requests while pro-
tecting a morally warm image leads consumers to under-represent their competence. Although consumers
care strongly about being viewed as competent, ﬁve studies showed that they downplayed their competence
to sidestep a prosocial request. This effect occurred across both self-reported and behavioral displays of com-
petence. Further, the downplaying competence effect only occurred when facing an undesirable prosocial
request, not a similarly undesirable proself request. The ﬁnal studies showed that people speciﬁcally down-
played competence and not warmth. We further distinguished between social warmth (e.g., humor) and
moral warmth (e.g., kindness), showing that when competence, social warmth, and moral warmth were all
requisite skills for a prosocial task, people downplayed competence and social warmth more than moral
warmth. These ﬁndings underscore that although people care strongly about being viewed as competent,
they willingly trade off competence evaluations if evaluations of warmth—particularly moral warmth—are at
risk.
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Introduction
Prosocial behavior is important to nearly all con-
sumers and to marketers of charitable and other non-
proﬁt organizations, who often place burdensome
prosocial requests on consumers. When facing a bur-
densome prosocial request—that is, a request to help
others—consumers often face an unpleasant tradeoff
between sacriﬁcing their time and seeming less kind
and caring (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009; Dunn,
Ashton-James, Hanson, & Aknin, 2010; O’Keefe &
Figge, 1999; Schaumberg & Wiltermuth, 2014). We
ask whether, while attempting to protect an image of
themselves as morally warm (e.g., being kind, caring,
and empathetic), consumers might sacriﬁce another
important image—their own competence—as a way
to justify avoidance of burdensome prosocial
requests. That is, we propose that despite the perva-
sive desire to seem competent (Alicke & Sedikides,
2009; Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003;
Sedikides, 1993; Taylor & Lobel, 1989), consumers
may prefer that their refusal of prosocial requests be
attributed to their incompetence (e.g., lacking the
necessary skills)—allowing their desire to be per-
ceived as morally warm to outweigh their desire to
be perceived as competent.
Conceptual Background
The Motivation to Display Competence
Our proposition stands in contrast to literature
that has underscored how important it is for people
to feel skilled and competent (Sedikides, 1993; Taylor
& Lobel, 1989) and to be viewed as competent by
others (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Judge & Bretz, 1994;
Rudman, 1998; Stevens & Kristof, 1995; Turnley &
Bolino, 2001). We deﬁne competence consistent with
prior literature (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007;
Wojciszke, 1994; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski,
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1998). As Fiske et al. (2007) stated, “There is no dis-
pute over the competence label; these traits include
clever, competent, creative, efﬁcient, foresighted,
ingenious, intelligent and knowledgeable” (p. 77).
The motivation to feel competent is so pervasive that
people often self-enhance and perceive themselves as
more competent than they are, a bias that operates
across many judgments that people make (Brown,
1986). For instance, people tend to overestimate their
skills and abilities across most domains (Dunning
et al., 2003). People also view themselves as better
than average at an impossible rate (Alicke &
Sedikides, 2009) and seek comparisons to lower-per-
forming others when their self-esteem is threatened
(Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wills, 1981; Wood, Giordano-
Beech, & Ducharme, 1999). Further, being seen by
others as competent generally has positive interper-
sonal consequences. Indeed, a main impression man-
agement strategy is self-promotion, in which people
play up skills, abilities, and achievements in order to
be viewed as competent (Jones & Pittman, 1982;
Judge & Bretz, 1994; Rudman, 1998; Stevens & Kris-
tof, 1995; Turnley & Bolino, 2001).
The Motivation to Display Warmth
In addition to competence, warmth is a primary
dimension on which people are readily judged.
According to prior literature, warmth is deﬁned as
encompassing two main kinds of traits: those related
to being moral (e.g., empathetic, kind, cooperative)
and those related to being sociable (e.g., playful,
happy, funny; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Kir-
mani, Hamilton, Thompson, & Lantzy, 2017).
Although competence is a fundamental dimension
for social evaluation, warmth appears to be the more
primary of the two dimensions (Fiske et al., 2007).
For instance, people are more sensitive to warmth
information, processing it more quickly and more
reliably than competence information (Willis &
Todorov, 2006; Ybarra, Chan, & Park, 2001). Addi-
tionally, judgments of a person’s warmth tend to
have a greater inﬂuence on observers’ affective and
behavioral reactions than judgments of a person’s
competence, affecting approach-avoid tendencies
(Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Peeters, 2002;
Wojciszke et al., 1998). Further, while not the focus
of our research, various reasons have been posited
for why the primacy of warmth over competence
makes sense, including evolutionary reasons (Fiske
et al., 2007). Do consumers therefore value their own
projected warmth over competence? Focusing on the
important consumer context of prosocial requests,
we argue that they do.
Maintaining Warmth When Facing Prosocial Requests
by Lowering Projected Competence
When consumers face prosocial requests, they
can either comply with the request or refuse it.
Often, people wish to refuse these requests, as they
can be burdensome (Koval, vanDellen, Fitzsimons,
& Ranby, 2015; Shaw, Batson, & Todd, 1994) and
are often viewed as conveying little personal beneﬁt
while having clear personal costs (Dunn, Aknin, &
Norton, 2014; Sierksma, Thijs, Verkuyten, & Kom-
ter, 2014). Yet, rejecting a prosocial request is not
costless either. After refusing to help others, people
are perceived as less morally warm—that is, they
are seen as more self-interested and less kind or
caring. People also often feel ashamed and guilty
for coming across to themselves and to others as
selﬁsh (Ariely et al., 2009; Dunn et al., 2010;
O’Keefe & Figge, 1999; Schaumberg & Wiltermuth,
2014). Thus, when facing a prosocial request, con-
sumers face an unpleasant tradeoff between their
resources and seeming self-interested and uncaring
both to themselves and others (Berman & Small,
2012; Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006; DellaVigna, List,
& Malmendier, 2012; Lin, Schaumberg, & Reich,
2016).
As stated earlier, being seen as warm is particu-
larly important in interpersonal interactions; this is
relevant when facing prosocial requests, as com-
plying with a prosocial request would reﬂect
warm traits (e.g., caring, empathetic, kind),
whereas refusing it would reﬂect the opposite.
Thus, we suggest that perceptions of consumers’
warmth are particularly in danger when facing
prosocial requests. Furthermore, drawing from the
distinction between moral aspects of warmth (e.g.,
kindness) and social aspects of warmth (e.g.,
humor; Goodwin et al., 2014; Kirmani et al., 2017;
Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007), we suggest that
moral (vs. social) warmth is particularly at risk
when people consider rejecting requests in the
prosocial context, as moral warmth is related to
the motivation to help others. Our research focuses
on the fundamental warmth versus competence
trade off (Fiske et al., 2007) that we suggest is
highly relevant when it comes to rejecting proso-
cial requests with requisite skills. With this empha-
sis on warmth, we follow prior theory and
distinguish between moral and social aspects of
warmth (Goodwin et al., 2014; Kirmani et al., 2017;
Leach et al., 2007). We suggest that people might
be aware that being perceived as less morally
warm (vs. less socially warm) is more harmful to
their image, as judgments of moral warmth are
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more important than those of social warmth in
person perception (Goodwin et al., 2014), and thus
people particularly wish to protect that image.
Given our focus, we posit that despite the impor-
tance of being perceived as competent, consumers
can justify their refusal of a prosocial request by
attributing it to lower competence (e.g., not having
the skills) rather than lower moral warmth (e.g.,
being less kind), allowing them to circumvent
prosocial requests while maintaining an image of
moral warmth.
In sum, a large body of literature shows that
people care strongly about being viewed as compe-
tent and exhibit a strong tendency to self-promote
(Jones & Pittman, 1982; Judge & Bretz, 1994;
Rudman, 1998; Stevens & Kristof, 1995; Turnley &
Bolino, 2001), and even to overestimate their skills
and abilities (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Brown,
1986; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). In the present
research, however, we bridge the literature on con-
sequences of rejecting prosocial requests (Berman &
Small, 2012; Dunn et al., 2010; O’Keefe & Figge,
1999; Schaumberg & Wiltermuth, 2014) with the lit-
erature on the primacy of warmth over competence
(Fiske et al., 2007) to hypothesize that consumers
willingly sacriﬁce competence evaluations so that
they can reject prosocial requests without sacriﬁcing
their image as morally warm.
The Present Research
We predict that when consumers desire to avoid a
prosocial request, they will downplay the compe-
tence skills relevant for the task. Across studies,
we employ different manipulations of the desire to
avoid a prosocial request as well as different mea-
sures of downplaying competence to provide con-
vergent evidence. Speciﬁcally, we manipulate
whether participants anticipate that they will face
a costly prosocial request (vs. not face the request)
prior to reporting their competence skills (Studies
1, 2, 5), whether the request is purely other-
focused (vs. offers self-interest; Study 3), and
whether the prosocial request will be highly time-
consuming (vs. easy; Study 4). We suggest that all
of these different ways of inducing the desire to
avoid a prosocial request will lead to downplaying
the competence skills relevant for the task.
Formally:
H1: Consumers will downplay the competence
skills relevant for a prosocial task if they desire
to avoid or refuse the prosocial request.
Further, our theory suggests that consumers
should only be motivated to downplay their com-
petence when rejecting a request would reﬂect
poorly on their moral warmth—that is, when these
unpleasant requests are prosocial (i.e., helping
others). Thus, this effect should not occur when
rejecting a similarly unpleasant—but nonprosocial
—request in general (e.g., an unpleasant task that
would offer only marginal beneﬁt for the self), as
refusing an unpleasant request in itself should not
reﬂect poorly on one’s moral warmth.
H2: Consumers will downplay competence more
when the undesirable request is highly prosocial
(i.e., helps others), relative to when the undesir-
able request instead helps the self.
Finally, our theorizing suggests that the reason con-
sumers downplay their competence is to protect their
warmth. This theorizing implies that consumers
should protect warmth perceptions (especially moral
warmth) over competence perceptions, even if warmth
is necessary for a prosocial request. For instance, vol-
unteering for a prosocial organization may require
competence skills (e.g., writing), social warmth skills
(e.g., humor), and moral warmth skills (e.g., empathy).
We theorize that participants will downplay compe-
tence skills and social warmth skills to a greater extent
than moral warmth skills. Formally:
H3: When faced with an undesirable prosocial
request, consumers will downplay competence
over warmth (and particularly, over moral
warmth rather than social warmth).
Our research thus contributes to an understand-
ing of how consumers reconcile their self-interested
behaviors with the desire to be seen as warm (par-
ticularly, morally warm), by showing how con-
sumers justify refusals of prosocial requests. This
research also contributes to the broader literatures
on the tradeoffs between warmth and competence
(Fiske et al., 2007; Holoien & Fiske, 2013) and the
importance of moral (vs. social) warmth in judg-
ment (Goodwin et al., 2014; Kirmani et al., 2017). It
also demonstrates a new instantiation of intentional
underperformance (e.g., Kidwell & Bennett, 1993;
White, Sanbonmatsu, Croyle, & Smittipatana, 2002)
discussed further in the General Discussion.
Overview of Studies
Five studies formally test our hypotheses. In Study
1, participants either anticipated a prosocial request
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(i.e., helping kids with arts and crafts) or not before
they reported their arts and crafts skills (H1). In
Study 2, we examined actual persistence on an aca-
demic competence task when performing well
would provide participants with an unwanted
prosocial request (H1). In Study 3, we tested
whether people would downplay skills only when
they wished to reject a request that was prosocial
(rather than self-beneﬁcial; H2). In Study 4, we
manipulated whether participants wanted to help
or not on a task requiring writing competence and
examined whether participants downplayed their
competence and also whether participants down-
played their warmth (H3). Study 4 also further
expanded in terms of the type of competence mea-
sure utilized (i.e., choosing to communicate with
words indicating lower vocabulary-based compe-
tence). Finally, Study 5 examined whether people
differentially downplay their evaluations of compe-
tence and warmth when both are relevant to the
task. Further, we tested whether people differen-
tially downplay their moral warmth (e.g., being
kind and empathetic) and social warmth (e.g., being
social and funny). As we argued earlier, in the
prosocial context, people should be motivated to
maintain their projected moral warmth in particu-
lar; it follows that downplaying moral warmth
skills would be counterproductive to their goals.
Thus, we tested whether people would preserve
their moral warmth above and beyond their social
warmth and competence (H3).
For all studies, we collected data until we
obtained a predetermined sample size and did not
analyze data until all data collection was complete.
Adults ages 18 years and above located in the Uni-
ted States were eligible to participate, no other
independent variables or manipulations were used
besides those reported, and no participant observa-
tions were excluded from analysis other than the
observations speciﬁed in the method of Study 1.
Finally, all dependent variables are reported. A uni-
versity institutional review board approved the
research.
Study 1: In the Field
In Study 1, we tested our main hypothesis that peo-
ple downplay their competence when they wish to
avoid a prosocial request (H1) in a ﬁeld setting. We
approached people (primarily commuters) waiting
at a train station and asked them to evaluate their
arts and crafts skills. In one randomly assigned con-
dition, participants were told that we were working
with a local children’s charity looking for people
who are good at arts and crafts to volunteer a few
hours of their time in the upcoming weeks—a bur-
densome request to the average busy commuter.
We hypothesized that, relative to a condition in
which participants were simply asked to evaluate
their skills, these participants would present their
skills as lower so they would be able to justiﬁably
avoid volunteering. Finally, we captured intentions
to volunteer at the end of the study; we predicted
that those who downplayed their skills would be
less likely to show interest in volunteering, as they
would presumably feel they had justiﬁed their refu-
sal of the request.
Method
Participants and design. The study had a 2 (an-
ticipation of prosocial request: yes, no) groups
between-subjects design. Because this study was
about volunteering for a local charity, the research
assistants (blind to the study hypothesis) collecting
data made note when participants told them that
the study was not applicable to them (i.e., they
either lived too far from the area where the study
was being done or would not be in the area where
the study was being done in the upcoming weeks).
Given the conceptual deﬁnition of competence as
traits that “include clever, competent, creative, efﬁ-
cient, foresighted, ingenious, intelligent and knowl-
edgeable” (Fiske et al., 2007, p. 77), individuals
who gave the reason of not living nearby were not
classiﬁed as downplaying competence. There were
ten such participants, and they were excluded from
all analysis. Thus, of the total 118 participants, 108
participants (Mage = 36.97; 51.9% female) were left
in the ﬁnal sample (results are similar if no partici-
pants are excluded from analysis; see
Appendix S1).
Procedure. Research assistants blind to the
study’s hypotheses approached people at a local
train station and asked if they would be willing to
answer a few questions. People who agreed to par-
ticipate were then handed a ﬂyer that either said:
“We are conducting research for a local children’s
charity that is looking for people who are good at
arts and crafts to volunteer a few hours of their
time in the upcoming weeks” (anticipated request
condition) or “We are conducting research that is
looking to examine people’s perceptions of their
skills in different domains” (no anticipated request
condition). The ﬂyer that participants were handed
was pulled from a stack of randomly sorted ﬂyers
and was folded in half so that research assistants
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did not know which ﬂyer each participant had
received.
After participants read their randomly assigned
ﬂyer, the research assistants asked them to respond
to our dependent variable: “How would you say
you are at arts and crafts on a scale from 1 to 7,
where 1 is very bad and 7 is very good?”
Finally, to gauge volunteering intentions, all par-
ticipants were provided with a second ﬂyer that
read: “A local children’s charity is looking for peo-
ple who are good at arts and crafts to volunteer a
few hours of their time in the upcoming weeks.
Would you be willing to be contacted further about
volunteering for this charity? If yes, please provide
your email address to the researcher.” See Appen-
dix S1 for ﬂyers used and stimuli for all studies.
Results
Skill evaluation. As hypothesized (H1), people
represented themselves as signiﬁcantly less skilled
in arts and crafts in the condition in which they
anticipated being asked for help (M = 3.08,
SD = 1.67) versus did not (M = 3.88, SD = 1.61; t
(106) = 2.53, p = .013, d = 0.49).
Downstream likelihood of volunteering. A bino-
mial logistic regression revealed that those who
anticipated being asked for help provided their
email addresses at a nonsigniﬁcantly higher rate
(50.0%) than those who did not anticipate being
asked for help (41.1%), B = 0.36, SE = 0.39,
p = .35. However, when we added skill ratings into
the regression, skill level positively predicted likeli-
hood of giving an email address, B = 0.33,
SE = 0.13, p = .011, and the effect of condition
became stronger, B = .65, SE = 0.42, p = .123, sug-
gesting a suppression effect. Given that indirect
effects can exist in the absence of direct effects
(Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011), we con-
ducted a bootstrapping mediation analysis (Hayes,
2013) to test the indirect effect of condition on vol-
unteering via skill level. Skill level mediated the
effect of condition on volunteering, [95% CI: 0.008,
0.126], suggesting that those who anticipated being
asked for help reported a lower skill level, which
led them to be less likely to volunteer, supporting
our prediction that lowering one’s competence can
provide a justiﬁcation for not volunteering.
Discussion
Study 1 showed in a ﬁeld setting that people
were more likely to downplay their skill or ability
when they anticipated (vs. did not) that a prosocial
organization was going to ask them for help involv-
ing that skill or ability, supporting H1. Further,
there was an indirect effect such that those who
anticipated being asked for help downplayed their
skills and abilities, which was then linked with
being less likely to volunteer. We suggest that this
pattern occurred at least partly because those who
downplayed their skills felt adequately justiﬁed in
refusing the prosocial request, as they protected
their moral warmth by attributing their refusal to
their incompetence.
Although not our focus, the lack of direct effect
of prosocial request anticipation condition on vol-
unteering suggests an opposing force contributing
to the effect of condition on volunteering, causing a
suppression effect. For instance, perhaps being
exposed to the request twice, rather than once,
increased compliance in the anticipation condition.
Thus, we eliminate this possibility in future studies,
exposing all participants to information about the
request the same number of times. Additionally,
Study 1’s results are subject to an alternative expla-
nation that skill evaluations in the anticipation con-
dition were affected by being told about the
volunteering task (e.g., they could have imagined a
speciﬁc type of arts and crafts activity at which
they felt less skilled). We thus employ cleaner con-
trol conditions in subsequent studies.
Study 2: A Behavioral Measure of Competence to
Avoid Prosocial Requests
Study 2 further tested H1 but utilized a behavioral
measure of displaying competence—persistence on
an academic competence task. Additionally, we
examined a situation in which we emphasized to
participants that a prosocial request is possible but
avoidable. Based on research suggesting that people
would prefer not to be asked for their help at all
(Lin et al., 2016), Study 2 tested our prediction that
people may purposely spend less time on a compe-
tence task when they believe that doing well will
mean being faced with a prosocial request that they
do not want to accept. Finally, we employed clea-
ner control conditions than Study 1 by exposing all
participants to information about a charity prior to
gauging competence.
Method
Participants and design. Participants (N = 200;
Mage = 36.39; 50.0% female, 49.5% male, 0.5% other)
from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed this
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study at the end of an unrelated study. This study
had a 3 (beneﬁt for helping: no, high, control)
groups between-subjects design.
Procedure. Participants were randomly
assigned to a control condition, a prosocial oppor-
tunity with no ﬁnancial beneﬁt condition (making
the prosocial task undesirable), or a prosocial
opportunity with ﬁnancial beneﬁt condition (mak-
ing the prosocial task relatively desirable). All par-
ticipants read that they would take part in an
academic competence task. They further read that
this task was related to a separate extra feedback
task on a charitable organization’s informational
pamphlet to increase awareness about poverty in
Africa (i.e., a prosocial task). Then, we manipu-
lated whether participants desired to avoid engag-
ing in this prosocial task or not. In the control
condition, participants were told that they would
not have the opportunity to participate in the
extra charitable pamphlet feedback task, but rather
that the charitable organization simply wanted to
gauge the academic competence of panel mem-
bers. Thus, they did not anticipate facing a proso-
cial request whatsoever. In the prosocial
opportunity with high ﬁnancial beneﬁt condition,
participants were told that if they performed well
on the academic competence task, they would
have the voluntary opportunity to participate in
the extra charitable pamphlet feedback task (i.e.,
the pamphlet feedback task would be optional)
and would receive a $1.00 bonus payment if they
agreed to do the extra pamphlet feedback task. In
this case, participants anticipated facing a proso-
cial request, but it was desirable. In the prosocial
opportunity with no ﬁnancial beneﬁt condition,
participants were told that if they performed well
on the academic competence task, they would
have the voluntary opportunity to participate in
the extra charitable pamphlet feedback task but
would not receive any additional payment if they
agreed to do so. In this condition, we anticipated
that participants would desire to avoid the proso-
cial request and thus exhibit decreased compe-
tence, as evidenced by lower persistence on the
academic competence task. In all conditions, par-
ticipants were told they would receive information
on how well they performed on the academic
competence task.
All participants were then shown the academic
competence task, a 10-item Remote Associates
Task (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003), in which
participants view three words and try to identify
a word that is associated with all three. We
designed the task to have ﬁve easy questions
(e.g., “cream,” “skate,” “water,” [answer: “ice”]),
and ﬁve moderately difﬁcult questions (e.g.,
“force,” “line,” “mail” [answer: “air”]). Partici-
pants were told that they had unlimited time to
solve the ten questions but that they did not have
to complete all ten questions to do well because
the questions ranged in difﬁculty. The task was
designed such that participants would not be able
to solve all questions. Thus, task persistence (mea-
sured by how many seconds participants spent
on these questions) acted as our main dependent
variable.
Participants were then told how many items they
answered correctly. Finally, those who were not in
the control group read, “We currently have enough
participants helping with the pamphlet task, and
therefore, we do not need more participants.” Thus,
no participants actually completed the second task
of providing pamphlet feedback. At the end of the
study, participants ﬁlled out the contingencies of
self-worth subscales for virtue, academic compe-
tence, and approval from others as potential moder-
ators (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). In analyses
examining whether each subscale moderated the
effects presented, there were no signiﬁcant modera-
tions of the effects below, and thus we do not dis-
cuss them further.
Results
A one-way ANOVA on time spent on the aca-
demic competence task was signiﬁcant (F(2,
197) = 5.77, p = .004). As predicted, participants
spent signiﬁcantly less time (in seconds) on the
competence task in the prosocial opportunity with
no ﬁnancial beneﬁt condition (M = 133.76,
SD = 95.30) than in the control condition
(M = 184.96, SD = 129.44; p = .014, d = 0.45) or in
the prosocial opportunity with ﬁnancial beneﬁt con-
dition (M = 200.67, SD = 127.79; p = .001, d = 0.59).
There was no difference in time spent between the
control condition and the prosocial opportunity
with ﬁnancial beneﬁt condition (p = .444). These
results are consistent with log-transformed time
spent as the dependent variable.
We also examined the number of correct answers
on the competence task. Unexpectedly, there was a
signiﬁcant difference (F(2, 197) = 3.86, p = .023).
Participants in the prosocial opportunity with ﬁnan-
cial beneﬁt condition answered more questions cor-
rectly (M = 6.48, SD = 2.78) than those in the
prosocial opportunity with no ﬁnancial beneﬁt con-
dition (M = 5.39, SD = 2.61; t(197) = 2.36, p = .019,
d = 0.40) and the control condition (M = 5.43,
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SD = 2.26; t(197) = 2.44, p = .016, d = 0.41). There
was no difference between the no ﬁnancial beneﬁt
condition and the control condition, p = .93. As this
task was designed to have ﬁve easy (and ﬁve mod-
erately difﬁcult) questions, we had expected the
mean correct answers across conditions to be
approximately ﬁve, such that persistence would be
the differentiator across conditions. The ﬁnding that
the mean correct answers was higher in the proso-
cial opportunity with ﬁnancial beneﬁt condition
was somewhat unexpected. When we examined the
distribution of correct answers across conditions,
however, we observed that the number of partici-
pants getting all 10 questions correct was signiﬁ-
cantly higher in the prosocial opportunity with
ﬁnancial beneﬁt condition (n = 14) than in the
prosocial opportunity with no ﬁnancial beneﬁt con-
dition (n = 5; logistic regression: p = .035) and the
control condition (n = 4; logistic regression:
p = .017). This suggests that some participants in
the ﬁnancial beneﬁt condition may have cheated by
looking up answers online. Thus, we argue that
focusing on the signiﬁcantly higher persistence in
the prosocial request with no ﬁnancial beneﬁt con-
dition and control condition is most instructive.
Discussion
Study 2 provides further support for H1. People
not only under-represent their skills in prosocial
domains (Study 1), but also persist less on tasks
meant to reﬂect competence when they believe that
performing well could lead them to face an unde-
sirable (yet still voluntary) prosocial request (Study
2). This reﬂects the possibility that people put in
less effort to help others (e.g., reviewing papers)
when they think that doing well will qualify them,
but not obligate them, to help more (e.g., more
review requests). Thus, people might sabotage their
own performance when they believe performing
well will be “punished” with more costly or difﬁ-
cult requests.
Interestingly, the ﬁndings of Study 2 bear some
analogy to the role of moral hazard in contract
design from the economics literature but extend this
concept to a voluntary context. In the employment
context, if employees anticipate that high perfor-
mance will be costly (e.g., that it will lead to harder
work assignments), they may underperform to hide
their type from the ﬁrm (Bolton & Dewatripon,
2005). However, consumers are not obligated to
help charitable organizations. Unlike contract the-
ory models, which generally assume that people
will only shirk on their work if they would be
assigned more difﬁcult work, people in this study
were made aware that they would be able to refuse
the prosocial request. This implies that consumers
are aware that they can decline help requests yet
still underperform, suggesting that even a request
for help imposes a cost—that is, refusing a request
for help reﬂects poorly on one’s warmth (speciﬁ-
cally, one’s moral warmth).
Finally, we should note that our context was pri-
vate, and consumers’ behaviors were not observed
by peers. When underperforming carries higher
reputational and other costs (e.g., not being per-
ceived as a “team player” and thus being passed
over for a promotion), it is possible people would
simply comply with undesirable prosocial requests,
or make other justiﬁcations to not engage in them,
rather than to sacriﬁce their competence.
Study 3: Prosocial Versus Proself Requests
Our theory is centered on undesirable prosocial
requests, as we posit that people feel compelled to
downplay competence for such requests because
denying them would shed light on their moral
warmth. By contrast, an undesirable request that
would mainly help oneself would not shed light
on one’s moral warmth. Whereas the desire to
help was manipulated in Study 2, we made the
request equally undesirable in Study 3, but manip-
ulated whether the request was a prosocial or a
proself one. Thus, Study 3 tests H2: people will
downplay their competence when faced with an
undesirable prosocial request but not when faced
with a similarly undesirable proself request. Addi-
tionally, to enhance applicability to the consumer
context beyond charitable organizations soliciting
help, we conducted this study in the context of an
online review company offering either proself or
prosocial incentives for writing a (burdensome)
review for the company. This context has ecologic
validity as companies sometimes offer incentives
for writing reviews (e.g., the chance to win gift
cards) and as some companies have begun offering
prosocial incentives or rewards to consumers for
performing activities that beneﬁt the company
(e.g., AmazonSmile; Liu, Lamberton, & Haws,
2015).
Method
Participants and design. Participants (N = 252;
Mage = 34.77; 49.6% female, 50.4% male) from Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk completed this study, which
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was attached to the end of an unrelated study. This
study had a 3 (beneﬁciary of task: control, proso-
cial, proself) groups between-subjects design.
Procedure. Participants in all three randomly
assigned conditions read that there was an online
shopping review company collecting reviews. All
participants read that the review should be at least
300 words and would take approximately
20 minutes to write. In the control condition, par-
ticipants additionally read that the company was
planning to ask future Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers to write this review and that they person-
ally were not being asked to write the review;
instead, the company wanted to get an accurate
view of how consumers view their skills at writing
reviews. In the proself task condition, participants
read that the company was asking them to write
this review but that it was completely optional to
write this review. They also read that writing the
review would result in a $0.25 bonus to them-
selves. Thus, although participants would not
want to engage in the task (as a $0.25 bonus for
20 minutes is a highly undesirable rate for Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk), they would not feel that
refusing the request would reﬂect poorly on their
moral warmth. In the prosocial task condition,
participants were told the same information as in
the proself task condition except that they were
told writing the review would result in $0.25
being given to a charitable organization (Feeding
America). Thus, refusing the request would be a
refusal to help others, reﬂecting poorly on their
moral warmth. To ensure that participants read
the information correctly in the two noncontrol
conditions, participants were then asked, “Who
would beneﬁt from you writing this review?” (A
charity, Me).
All participants then responded to the two-item
dependent measure of competence (r = 0.79,
p < .001): “How good are your writing skills?”
(1 = extremely poor to 7 = extremely good); “How
qualiﬁed are you to write this review?” (1 = not at
all qualiﬁed to 7 = extremely qualiﬁed).
Finally, to check that the task of writing the
review was similarly unappealing in both the pros-
elf and prosocial conditions, all participants
responded to three items (a = 0.96): “To you, how
appealing or unappealing of a task is writing this
300-word review?” (1 = very unappealing, 7 = very
appealing); “To you, how desirable or undesirable of
a task is writing this 300-word review?” (1 = very
undesirable, 7 = very desirable); and “How much do
you want to write this review?” (1 = not at all,
7 = very much so).
Finally, for consistency with the cover story
and to make this a real request, those in the pro-
self and prosocial request conditions were asked
whether they would or would not write the
review, and those who agreed to write wrote a
review. In the proself conditions, these partici-
pants indeed received an additional $0.25 bonus
payment, and in the prosocial conditions, a $0.25
donation was made to Feeding America for each
participant.
Results
A one-way ANOVA on writing competence was
signiﬁcant (F(2, 249) = 5.68, p = .004). As predicted,
participants indicated that their writing compe-
tence was lower in the undesirable prosocial
request condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.72) than in the
control condition (M = 4.96, SD = 1.57; p = .003,
d = 0.47), replicating our basic effect (H1). Further,
participants indicated greater writing competence
in the undesirable proself request condition
(M = 4.92, SD = 1.69) than in the undesirable
prosocial request condition (p = .005, d = 0.43),
supporting H2. Finally, participants indicated simi-
lar writing competence in the undesirable proself
request condition as in the control condition
(p = .866, d = 0.02).
Finally, to check that the review writing task
was perceived to be similarly unappealing in both
the proself and prosocial conditions, we conducted
t-tests on the task appealingness composite. Impor-
tantly, participants found the request to be similarly
undesirable in the prosocial condition (M = 1.84,
SD = 1.28) and the proself condition (M = 1.95,
SD = 1.48), t(165) = 0.52, p = .606, d = 0.08. The
task was perceived to be more desirable in the con-
trol condition than in either request condition
(M = 2.86, SD = 1.88; ps < .001), likely because no
compensation amount was speciﬁed, such that par-
ticipants could have inferred a higher compensation
amount.
Discussion
Study 3 showed that participants only down-
played their competence when faced with an
undesirable prosocial request and not when faced
with a similarly undesirable proself request. These
ﬁndings support H2 and are consistent with our
theory that prosocial requests pose a particular
tension in that rejecting a request (for which one is
qualiﬁed) places evaluations of moral warmth at
risk.
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Study 4: Downplaying Competence But Not
Warmth
In the studies thus far, we assessed displayed com-
petence to test for our focal effect. However, it is
unclear whether the desire to avoid a prosocial
request requiring competence leads consumers to
downplay all positive traits, even warmth. Accord-
ing to H3, consumers will downplay competence
selectively to protect their projected warmth. Thus,
Study 4 tested whether, when consumers seek to
avoid a prosocial request requiring writing compe-
tence, they would convey less writing competence
but not less warmth. Additionally, to further
broaden the range of ways in which we gauge
downplaying competence, we examined a different
form of downplaying skills, other than gauging
skill estimates (Studies 1, 3) or task persistence
(Study 2): choosing to write with less competent
words.
Method
Participants and design. Participants (N = 198;
Mage = 34.48; 51.5% female, 48.0% male, 0.5% other)
from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed this
study. This study had a 2 (desire to help: control,
no) groups between-subjects design.
Procedure. The stimuli and procedure were
adapted from Holoien and Fiske (2013). All partici-
pants read the following: “Imagine that you
recently joined a book club. Every week, one mem-
ber writes an email with their thoughts about the
book. You know that the book club is currently
looking to ask someone to be the writing secretary
and write the newsletter for the book club group.
The writing secretary is someone who needs to
have very strong, competent writing skills.” In the
control condition, there was no further information
provided. In the desire-not-to-help condition, partic-
ipants were also told, “Being writing secretary will
take a lot of extra work each week so it’s not a very
desirable position.”
All participants were then shown a list of 24
words (order randomized for each participant) and
asked to “choose 12 of the following 24 words that
you would use in your email message about the
book.” The 24 words were previously selected and
pre-tested in the Amazon Mechanical Turk partici-
pant pool by Holoien and Fiske (2013) to include
six high-competence/high-warmth words (e.g.,
euphoric), six high-competence/low-warmth words
(e.g., melancholy), six low-competence/high-warmth
words (e.g., happy), and six low-competence/low-
warmth words (e.g., sad). These 24 particular
words were chosen by Holoien and Fiske (2013),
who stated that in operationalizing warmth and
competence, “warmth was conveyed by positivity,
and competence was conveyed by vocabulary
sophistication” (p. 35). Thus, for example, happy is
considered high in positivity (i.e., warmth) but low
in vocabulary sophistication (i.e., competence), as
conﬁrmed by a pre-test they conducted (table 1 in
Holoien & Fiske, 2013; see Figure 1 for dependent
measure calculation information). Finally, partici-
pants responded to a manipulation check question:
“Did you want to be the writing secretary for the
book club?” (1 = deﬁnitely did not want to be the writ-
ing secretary, 7 = deﬁnitely wanted to be the writing
secretary).
High-competence/High-warmth words
Euphoric
Prodigious
Unprecedented
Exemplary
Commendable
Exquisite
High-competence/Low-warmth words
Melancholy
Inept
Trite
Mediocre
Deficient
Repugnant
Low-competence/High-warmth words
Happy
Brainy
New
Fab
Great
Pretty
Low-competence/Low-warmth words
Sad
Stupid
Old
Lousy
Weak
Nasty
Key
Dependent measure (# of competence words) = total # of words used out of the 12 words in the solid-lined box
Dependent measure (# of warmth words) = total # of words used out of the 12 words in the dashed-lined box
Figure 1. Study 4: Diagram indicating how the two dependent measures (No. of competence words, No. of warmth words) were calculated.
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Results
Manipulation check (desire to be the writing secre-
tary). Participants indicated that they wanted to
be the writing secretary less in the desire-not-to-
help condition (M = 2.86, SD = 1.85) than in the
control condition (M = 3.83, SD = 1.93), t
(196) = 3.60, p < .001, d = 0.51.
Dependent measures (No. of competence words, No.
of warmth words). First, we calculated two depen-
dent measures for each participant: the total num-
ber of competence words used and the total
number of warmth words used (see Figure 1 for a
diagram illustrating how each is calculated). Given
these two dependent measures per participant, we
treated these two dependent measures as a within-
subjects factor in a 2 (desire to help [between-sub-
jects factor]: control, no) 9 2 (word type [within-
subjects factor]: competence, warmth) mixed
ANOVA.
This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant interaction, F
(1, 196) = 15.29, p < .001, g2p = 0.07. See Figure 2.
Follow-up simple-effects tests showed that as pre-
dicted, participants in the desire-not-to-help condi-
tion used fewer words conveying competence
(M = 6.21, SD = 2.29) relative to participants in the
control condition (M = 7.61, SD = 2.45; t(196) =
4.16, p < .001, d = 0.59). In contrast, participants
in the desire-not-to-help condition did not use
fewer words conveying warmth relative to partici-
pants in the control condition; if anything, they
used directionally more words conveying warmth
(M = 8.45, SD = 2.55) relative to participants in the
control condition (M = 7.89, SD = 2.24; t
(196) = 1.65, p = .101, d = 0.23).
Discussion
Study 4 replicated the basic effect, showing
that when consumers desire to avoid a prosocial
request (i.e., the request is particularly unpleas-
ant), they downplay their request-relevant skills
(H1). Further, Study 4 contributes beyond the
prior studies in two ways. First, Study 4 utilized
a different type of displayed competence measure:
the types of words selected for an email message,
rather than direct reports of skill level (Studies 1,
3) or task persistence (Study 2). This suggests that
people might attempt to display low competence
in subtle ways to signal that they are not quali-
ﬁed to engage in prosocial behavior. Second,
Study 4 showed that participants downplayed
competence but did not similarly downplay
warmth in response to an undesirable prosocial
request. If anything, they directionally increased
their warmth. This supports H3: consumers
downplay competence over warmth when facing
prosocial requests.
However, although warmth is generally neces-
sary when engaging in prosocial requests (i.e., only
those who are kind, generous, empathetic, etc., tend
to engage in such requests), this was not made
explicit in Study 4. Thus, in Study 5, we test
whether people will downplay competence more
than warmth even when warmth is explicitly
required for the prosocial task at hand. Further-
more, Study 5 differentiates between social warmth
and moral warmth.
Study 5: Protecting Projected Moral Warmth
In Study 5, we further tested H3 by investigating
how consumers trade off projected competence
and warmth when they are both explicitly rele-
vant to the task. Additionally, we tested whether
consumers differentially downplay their projected
moral warmth (e.g., being kind and empathetic)
and social warmth (e.g., being social and funny).
We argue that consumers would trade off their
competence to preserve their projected warmth,
particularly warmth as it is related to their moral
character. Thus, we expected that consumers
would preserve their moral warmth above and
beyond their social warmth and their
competence.
0
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Figure 2. Study 4: Number of competence and warmth words
used in the control condition and in the desire-not-to-help condi-
tion. Note. Graph depicts means and standard errors of the
mean.
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Procedure
Participants and design. Participants (N = 670;
Mage = 36.43, 3 missing or impossibly high age;
49.10% male, 50.30% female, 0.6% other or missing
gender) from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed
this study, which had a 2 (request for help [be-
tween-subjects factor]: yes, no) 9 3 (skill category
[within-subjects factor]: moral warmth, social
warmth, writing competence) mixed design.
Method. Participants were randomly assigned
to a control (no request for help) or prosocial
request condition. Participants read: “We are collab-
orating with a nonproﬁt organization whose goal is
to motivate at-risk youth to stay in school. This
organization is collecting essays for the students. If
you agree to write the essay, there will be more
instructions, including essay prompts.” In the
prosocial request condition, participants were asked
if they would be willing to write the essay. They
additionally read that it was optional but would be
helpful to the organization, that it would take
approximately ﬁve minutes, and that there would
be no additional payment associated with the task.
In the control condition, participants read that they
were not being asked to write the essay, but instead
that the organization was trying to get an accurate
view of their skills. They then read that the essay
would take ﬁve minutes—this information was
given to ensure that participants imagined a similar
task across the two conditions.
All participants were then told that the following
skills were necessary to write the essay (presented
in random order): “empathy and kindness skills”
(moral warmth), “social and humor skills” (social
warmth) and “writing and vocabulary skills” (writ-
ing competence). Participants then responded to six
items corresponding to two items each for the three
skill categories, rating how good they were at
understanding and sharing others’ thoughts and
feelings (i.e., at being empathetic), being considerate
and kind, being sociable, being funny and humor-
ous, writing persuasively, and writing with strong
vocabulary skills (e.g., using a wide range of
words, using advanced words; 1 = extremely bad,
7 = extremely good). A factor analysis (principal
component analysis, varimax rotation) conﬁrmed
three factors: moral warmth (2 items: r = .74,
p < .001), social warmth (2 items: r = .51, p < .001),
and competence (2 items: r = .64, p < .001).
Finally, for consistency with the cover story,
those in the request condition were asked whether
they would like to write the essay, and those who
agreed to write wrote a short essay in response to a
prompt of their choosing regarding their experience
in school.
Results
We ran a mixed effects model, including random
effects for participants (to control for repeated
observations), regressing reported skill level on skill
category (moral warmth, social warmth, and writ-
ing competence), request condition (prosocial
request vs. control), and their 2-way interaction (us-
ing “lmerTest” package [Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, &
Christensen, 2014] in R statistical software [R Core
Team, 2014]; note: mixed models often yield nonin-
teger degrees of freedom). We found a signiﬁcant
interaction, F(2, 1336) = 3.46, p = .032; see Figure 3.
To decompose the interaction, we compared the
effect of the request condition between each of the
three skill categories. The effect of the request con-
dition on moral warmth was signiﬁcantly different
from the effect of the request condition on writing
competence, B = 0.29, t(1336) = 2.55, p = .011, and
marginally different from the effect of the request
condition on social warmth, B = 0.21, t(1336) = 1.84,
p = .067. The effects of the request condition on
social warmth and writing competence were not
different from each other, B = .08, t(1336) = .72,
p = .47.
Next, we examined the simple effects of request
condition for each skill category. People represented
their competence as lower when asked to engage in
prosocial behavior (M = 4.51, SD = 1.54) than when
not asked (M = 4.99, SD = 1.26), B = 0.47, t
(1486.30) = 4.45, p < .001. People also represented
themselves as lower in social warmth when asked
to engage in prosocial behavior (M = 4.36,
SD = 1.44) than when not asked (M = 4.75,
SD = 1.34), B = 0.39, t(1486.30) = 3.68, p < .001.
However, people only represented themselves as
marginally lower in moral warmth when asked to
engage in prosocial behavior (M = 5.33, SD = 1.36)
than when not asked (M = 5.51, SD = 1.26),
B = 0.18, t(1486.30) = 1.70, p = .09. In the context of
the interaction analyses, the effect of request condi-
tion on moral warmth was signiﬁcantly weaker
than on competence, and marginally weaker than
on social warmth.
Discussion
In Study 5, we found that people downplayed
their competence and social warmth when faced
with a prosocial request that required those skills,
but that they did not downplay their moral warmth
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to the same extent. These ﬁndings support H3 and
are consistent with our theorizing that the down-
playing of one’s competence when faced with unde-
sirable prosocial requests stems from a desire to
project an image of oneself as warm, and speciﬁ-
cally as morally warm. People were not willing to
sacriﬁce their projected moral warmth perceptions
to avoid a prosocial request, while being willing to
sacriﬁce their projected social warmth. This sug-
gests that when trading off warmth and compe-
tence perceptions, people indeed prioritize warmth
over competence, but it is speciﬁcally moral
warmth that matters most.
General Discussion
Five studies conducted in different contexts (four
including actual rather than hypothetical behavior,
one of which was conducted in the ﬁeld) showed
that consumers downplay their competence to
avoid prosocial requests. In Study 1, participants in
the ﬁeld evaluated their skills as lower when they
anticipated that they would be asked to use those
skills to help a charitable organization. In Study 2,
participants spent less time on a competence task
when they believed that good performance would
qualify them for a prosocial opportunity that they
would want to refuse. In Study 3, participants only
downplayed their competence in response to proso-
cial requests and not for similarly undesirable pros-
elf requests, providing evidence that our effect is
due to a desire to project moral warmth. In Study
4, participants downplayed their competence in a
different way (using less competent words), but did
not downplay their warmth when they wanted to
avoid a prosocial request. Finally, in Study 5, when
competence, social warmth, and moral warmth
were all requisite skills for a prosocial request, par-
ticipants selectively downplayed competence and
social warmth more than moral warmth. In sum,
we show that when consumers are faced with
undesirable prosocial requests, they wish to attri-
bute their refusal to their lack of competence (e.g.,
“I wouldn’t be good at that”) rather than to their
lack of moral warmth (e.g., “I just don’t want to
help”). Thus, the desire to be perceived as morally
warm outweighed the desire to be perceived as
competent (and also as socially warm).
Theoretical Contributions
These ﬁndings contribute to understanding when
consumers’ communication and behaviors may
reﬂect the primacy of the warmth dimension over
the competence dimension (Fiske et al., 2007), and
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Figure 3. Study 5: Displayed competence, social warmth, and moral warmth in both request conditions (when competence, social
warmth, and moral warmth are all skills useful for helping). Note. Graph depicts means and standard errors of the mean. Cohen’s d
and p-values corresponding to the simple effects of request condition on each type of skill are also reported.
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further, the primacy of the moral warmth dimension
in particular (Goodwin et al., 2014; Leach et al.,
2007). While prior work shows that people place
particular weight on moral warmth when evaluat-
ing social others (Goodwin et al., 2014; Leach et al.,
2007) and on competence when evaluating service
providers (Kirmani et al., 2017), our work shows
that people may intuit the weight placed on moral
warmth in the social evaluation context and priori-
tize their own display of moral warmth when
responding to undesirable prosocial requests.
Our research also contributes to work on how
consumers justify avoidance of prosocial requests.
Research has found that consumers reject prosocial
requests by adjusting perceptions of and feelings
toward help-seekers (e.g., the deservingness of the
help-seeker; Exley, 2016; Shaw et al., 1994) or the
competence of the help-seeker (e.g., the charity’s
level of overhead; Gneezy, Keenan, & Gneezy,
2014). Our research asks whether consumers might
sacriﬁce another important image—their own com-
petence. We thus identiﬁed another route through
which people may reject or avoid prosocial
requests: altering evaluations of their own ability to
be helpful to help-seekers. Whereas adjusting one’s
feelings toward help-seekers seems to effectively
serve self-interested motivations—avoiding proso-
cial behavior while protecting one’s self-views—
downplaying one’s competence seems less intuitive.
That is, people appear willing to incur a cost on
their projected competence in order to avoid a
potential cost on their moral warmth. This tendency
also suggests that rewarding hard work with the
voluntary opportunity to perform more work is not
incentive compatible, as people persist less when
they believe high performance will lead to an unde-
sirable voluntary request (Study 2).
Our boundary conditions also provided evidence
for our theory. Study 3 shows that the downplay-
ing competence effect only occurs for undesirable
prosocial requests, not for similarly undesirable
proself requests. Presumably, rejection of a proso-
cial request places evaluations of one’s moral
warmth at risk (whereas rejection of a proself
request does not) such that downplaying one’s abil-
ity to help is one way to mitigate that risk. Our dis-
tinction between proself and prosocial incentives
contributes to prior work on responses to these dif-
ferent kinds of incentives and rewards. Although
prior work examines their differential effectiveness
(Ariely et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2015; Osterhus, 1997),
we focused on the case when a request is highly
undesirable, showing that prosocial and proself
incentives elicit different ways of refusing the
request. Speciﬁcally, prosocial (vs. proself) incen-
tives are likely to elicit lack of competence as a
reason for refusal.
Further supporting our theory, Study 5 built on
work on the distinction between moral warmth and
social warmth (Goodwin et al., 2014; Kirmani et al.,
2017; Leach et al., 2007) to show that when both
kinds of warmth, along with competence in a tradi-
tional nonwarmth domain (writing), are requisite
skills, people downplay both writing competence
and social warmth more than moral warmth. Col-
lectively, these studies indicate that consumers par-
ticularly aim to protect evaluations of their moral
warmth in the face of undesirable prosocial
requests.
It is also interesting to consider the present work
in light of other work reporting social reasons for
underperformance. For instance, White et al. (2002)
found evidence of “socially motivated under-
achievement,” wherein participants underper-
formed when concerned about hurting the feelings
of a likable confederate who failed at a task and
could observe the participant’s performance. How-
ever, in the case of socially motivated under-
achievement, people self-sacriﬁced to help others
(i.e., for a prosocial reason) rather than to avoid
helping others as in our research. Additionally,
other research ﬁnds evidence of the “propensity to
withhold effort” (Kidwell & Bennett, 1993), wherein
people underperform within work groups in which
they can shirk their duties, loaf, or free ride on
others’ efforts. Similar to this prior work, we ﬁnd
that people withhold effort to avoid working hard.
However, in our work, people speciﬁcally wish to
maintain their perceptions of moral warmth, rather
than to simply shirk off their duties, which likely
makes people appear less morally warm (e.g., less
helpful). Our research builds on this past research
that shows prosocial (protecting others’ feelings;
White et al., 2002) and self-interested (shirking
duties; Kidwell & Bennett, 1993) reasons for under-
performance: namely, people can underperform to
appear prosocial, but to act out of self-interest.
Directions for Future Research
We focused on the classic warmth and compe-
tence dimensions as they are argued to be the uni-
versal dimensions of social cognition (Fiske et al.,
2007) and as we suggest they are highly relevant
when it comes to rejecting prosocial requests with
requisite skills. Although warmth is often conceptu-
alized as inclusive of moral character (Fiske et al.,
2007), we further separated moral warmth from
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social warmth (Goodwin et al., 2014; Kirmani et al.,
2017; Leach et al., 2007). However, we did not con-
sider characteristics relating to moral character that
did not overlap with warmth (e.g., being coura-
geous, principled, and fair; Goodwin et al., 2014;
Kirmani et al., 2017). Consistent with prior research
(Goodwin et al., 2014), consumers valued moral
warmth more than social warmth in our research.
However, prior research also shows that moral
traits that do not overlap with warmth can be val-
ued even more than moral warmth (Goodwin et al.,
2014). Thus, a key question is whether consumers
wish to maintain their moral warmth in particular
or if this effect reﬂects a general desire to protect
their overarching moral character. We contend that
engaging in prosocial behavior mainly reﬂects
moral traits related to warmth (e.g., being giving,
kind, helpful, and cooperative). Indeed, prior
research has characterized authentic prosocial moti-
vation as reﬂecting a true concern for others (Bar-
asch, Levine, Berman, & Small, 2014). These
researchers deﬁne moral character in the prosocial
context as having “altruism-relevant” traits, which
resemble moral warmth traits (e.g., nice, sincere);
they exclude “altruism-irrelevant” moral traits,
which resemble nonwarm moral traits (e.g., honest,
righteous). Thus, although they do not use the
warm/nonwarm terms, their focus on altruism-rele-
vant traits supports our focus on moral warmth.
However, engaging in prosocial behavior may
reﬂect on other moral traits secondarily (e.g., being
principled). Future research should test whether
consumers believe their nonwarm moral traits are
also at stake when they turn down prosocial
requests, and if this also inﬂuences projected com-
petence.
The present research offers several other future
research directions. First, do consumers believe
their own lower competence evaluations and
performance, and how do their competence
evaluations compare to reality? Given that people’s
self-views are generally enhanced (e.g., Brown,
1986), it is possible that the motivation to avoid a
prosocial request may shift people to internally
view their skills in a more realistic, honest light,
thereby undoing self-enhancement bias. Indeed,
research suggests that self-enhancement is a “light”
form of self-deception and can be successfully chal-
lenged (see Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). For instance,
when asked to engage in an undesirable prosocial
task, people might (accurately) attribute instances
of prior poor performance to their own skills rather
than to outside circumstances. This would suggest
that people internalize their new self-views. On the
other hand, people may maintain their enhanced
self-views, and simply under-represent their beliefs;
thus, their underestimation of their skills just hap-
pens to be closer to objective truth than their own
self-belief. A third possibility is that participants
become biased in the other direction (e.g., attribut-
ing all failure to themselves and success to outside
circumstances). Future research should examine
whether certain motivations (e.g., to avoid prosocial
requests) can affect the existence or direction of
self-enhancement bias.
A related, but separate, question is whether con-
sumers are attempting to protect their externally
projected or their self-perceived moral warmth. We
can only conclude here that participants are at least
protecting their projected moral warmth. However,
research implies that people are not only worried
about being perceived poorly by others, but that
they also wish to avoid negative self-judgment (Lin
et al., 2016). Thus, in an attempt to view themselves
as morally warm, people may convince themselves
internally that they are unqualiﬁed for tasks. Other
than in Study 1, participants self-reported their skill
levels or engaged in behavioral displays of compe-
tence anonymously online; thus, participants were
at least not simply trying to be polite or avoid an
awkward face-to-face encounter. Future research
may further address whether people aim to protect
their externally projected or internally perceived
moral warmth.
Future research may also vary characteristics of
the help-seeker. Organizations, brands, and service
providers differ in their positioning as competent,
socially warm, or morally warm (Aaker, Vohs, &
Mogilner, 2010; Kirmani et al., 2017). This raises the
question of whether consumers react differently to
requests for help as a function of such positioning.
For instance, consumers might believe that adher-
ing to requests from morally warm entities may
reﬂect to a greater extent on their moral character,
such that they are more likely to downplay their
competence when facing an undesirable request
from such entities.
Finally, as many marketers of charitable and
other nonproﬁt organizations seek to encourage
consumers to engage in more helping behavior
(Garcia, Weaver, Darley, & Spence, 2009; Kulow &
Kramer, 2016; Liu & Aaker, 2008; Reed, Kay,
Finnel, Aquino, & Levy, 2016), what strategies
could be used to mitigate the likelihood that con-
sumers sidestep prosocial requests by downplaying
their skills and abilities? Even some for-proﬁt com-
panies (e.g., Amazon) may be interested in such
strategies, to the extent that they offer prosocial
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incentives for engaging in activities that beneﬁt the
company (similar to our Study 3). One possibility is
that help-seekers could emphasize that help from
consumers of all skills and abilities would be desir-
able or that the requisite skills are related to moral
warmth (e.g., kindness, generosity), which our
research shows that consumers are more reluctant
to downplay. Help-seekers might also ask con-
sumers to evaluate their skills before revealing that
they will be asking for help. Taking this justiﬁcation
away may leave consumers feeling that they cannot
refuse the prosocial request without seeming self-
interested (Lin, Zlatev, & Miller, 2017). Further,
charitable marketing campaigns that use these
approaches while also explicitly placing moral
warmth at risk may be particularly effective (e.g.,
“show kindness and empathy. . .we seek individu-
als with all skill levels to help at our charity
event”). Our ﬁndings may also be relevant to other
prosocial consumption behaviors, such as engaging
in sustainable behaviors (e.g., composting, conserv-
ing energy, eating less meat). While people may
downplay their competence in order to justify
avoiding those behaviors, marketers may wish to
appeal to their moral warmth and emphasize that
the behaviors are not as difﬁcult as perceived.
Conclusion
Although much prior research has pointed to the
importance that people place on their competence,
we ﬁnd that in the face of undesirable prosocial
requests, people downplay their competence. This
lowering of competence only occurs when refusing
the request would reﬂect poorly on moral warmth
(i.e., prosocial requests); it does not occur when
refusing the request is irrelevant to warmth percep-
tions (i.e., proself requests). Additionally, when com-
petence, social warmth, and moral warmth are all
requisite skills for a prosocial task, people downplay
competence and social warmth more than moral
warmth. These ﬁndings point to consumers’ desire
to protect evaluations of their warmth, particularly
moral warmth, in the face of undesirable prosocial
requests, and further offer contributions to the con-
sumer psychology literature through understanding
how consumers avoid prosocial behavior.
Data Collection and Analysis Information
The data for Study 1 were collected at the Palo
Alto Caltrain Station by two research assistants
under the supervision of Stephanie Lin in July-
August 2015. The data for Studies 2-5 were col-
lected on Amazon Mechanical Turk under the
supervision of Peggy Liu in April 2016 (Study 2),
July 2017 (Study 3), October 2016 (Study 4), and
May 2017 (Study 5). Studies 1, 2, and 5 were ana-
lyzed by Stephanie Lin, and Studies 3 and 4 were
analyzed by Peggy Liu.
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